Telegramele Wikileaks 31

Ponta la Ambasada SUA de la București – “Opere complete”. În cîteva telegrame, integral în original mai jos, tot ce a spus Ponta în spatele ușilor închise.

DECL: 06/28/2017

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RO

SUBJECT: UNINOMINAL REFORM IN PARLIAMENT: DEAD ON ARRIVAL?

Classified By: Pol Couns Ted Tanoue for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

1. (C) Summary. Despite widespread popular support and a unified draft law ostensibly supported by all the three major Romanian political parties–PSD, PNL, PD–Embassy interlocutors from all political stripes have been telling us that uninominal electoral reform is doomed to failure and that the current hype regarding the uninominal vote is justfor show. Our contacts predict that the draft law will fail to pass when it is brought to a vote at the electoral code committee in the Chamber of Deputies, and will be brought down by tactical absences of key PSD legislators that will ensure that the vote will fail to win committee approval by just one or two votes. Our interlocutors also predict that President Basescu will call a referendum on electoral reform–to take place simultaneously with the Fall 2008 European Parliament elections, putting further pressure on an embattled Parliament. End Summary.

2. (C) In a meeting with Polcouns June 22, PSD member Victor Ponta–a vocal proponent of uninominal electoral reform–suggested that despite his party’s public support for the electoral reform, and that the five PSD members sitting on the electoral code committee will likely vote against the draft law, causing the bill to fall short of the 10 required votes. Ponta said that PSD seniors, led by PSD Chamber of Deputies head Viorel Hrebenciuc, were working behind the scenes to undermine electoral reform, as abandonment of the current “party list” system would erode their political standing with the PSD.

3. (C) In a subsequent meeting with Poloff June 26, UDMR Senator Peter Eckstein-Kovacs confirmed that the UDMR was publicly opposed to electoral reform, noting that his party would suffer under a uninominal system and risked losing a number of seats that the UDMR currently enjoyed under the party-list system. Eckstein-Kovacs added that while all of the major political parties were professing support for electoral reform in order to pander to the voters, none with the exception of the PD would actually favor a uninominal system when it came to a vote. Another UDMR contact, Andras Levente Mate, said that his party would likely be offering a series of amendments to the draft law in order to drag out the debate on electoral reform law until December, ensuring that no electoral reforms would be adopted in time to take effect before the Fall 2008 parliamentary elections.

4. (C) Education Minister Cristian Adomnitei (PNL) echoed this pessimistic view about prospects for electoral reform. At a meeting with Polcouns June 27, he insisted that the PNL’s support for a uninominal system was genuine, given that the PNL’s core constituency was the well-educated, urban electorate which generally favored creating a uninominal electoral system. He predicted, however, that PSD deputies would ultimately balk at voting for the uninominal support. He added that while President Basescu was a late convert to the uninominal cause, he would use Parliament’s failure to adopt a uninominal system as a major part of his electoral strategy in coming months.

5. (C) The President of the Pro-Democracy Association (APD) NGO, Cristian Pirvulescu, told Poloff June 26 that support for electoral reform was waning quickly, adding that the only true believers now appeared to be PSD deputy Ponta and PNL Vice President Mihai Voicu. Pirvulescu opined that, in addition to the declared opponents of the draft electoral reform law (UDMR, PRM) even its professed supporters (PSD, PNL, PD) did not truly support the law. He added that mainstream parties were just “putting on a show” in order to draw public support. He noted that even President Basescu remained at heart a supporter of a French-style majoritarian system that would increase his own institutional powers and give his party a stronger presence in parliament. He echoed others’ comments that PSD Chamber of Deputies whip Hrebenciuc was working behind the scenes to torpedo the project. Pirvulescu predicted that Hrebenciuc would manipulate the votes in committee to assure failure; on the day of the vote, two PSD deputies would–mysteriously–call in sick, assuring that the draft law would fail to win committee approval, just one or two votes shy of the total votes needed.

6. (C) Comment: President Basescu’s public advocacy of uninominal electoral reforms means that he now confronts a win-win solution–whatever the outcome of the current debate.

Embassy interlocutors were nearly unanimous in predicting that failure of parliament to pass an electoral reform package would trigger a move by the President to schedule a referendum on adopting a uninominal system, set to coincide with the Europarliamentary elections this fall. One of the Prime Minister’s advisors confirmed to us that the PM and his political allies were holding back on setting a firm date for the EP elections precisely because they wanted to complicate Basescu’s ability to couple the referendum to the Europarliamentary contest. We note, too, that scheduling a referendum on an issue as popular as the uninominal system would likely assure a higher voter turnout for the EP elections. While such a referendum will have no legal force, it will add further popular pressure for Parliament to take action, and a high vote turnout would buttress arguments from the Basescu camp that the EP contest has provided yet another mandate to the President. End Comment.

TAUBMAN

 

 

 

DECL: 08/16/2017

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RO

SUBJECT: SPONTANEOUS COMBUSTION: GEOANA ANNOUNCES NO-CONFIDENCE MOTION BY SEPTEMBER 10

REF: A. BUCHAREST 846 B. BUCHAREST 797

Classified By: Political Counselor Theodore Tanoue for Reasons 1.4 (b) (d).

1. (C) Summary: An informal PSD strategy meeting August 14 reportedly developed into a gripe session among party leaders unhappy with the party’s current strategy of “constructive opposition” (e.g., silent support for the ultra-minority Tariceanu government.) A brief session apparently ended with PSD head Mircea Geoana agreeing to end the PSD’s cohabitation with the Tariceanu government. Geoana subsequently announced that he would table a no-confidence vote by September 10. However, despite the PSD’s insistence that it is serious about bringing down the government, these are still the opening gambits in a complex game that leaves plenty of wriggle room for Tariceanu’s survival. End Summary.

2. (C) Prior to the PSD’s August 14 strategy meeting, a number of PSD contacts warned of growing discontent among local party leaders and parliamentarians with the direction that the party had taken under the helm of Mircea Geoana and de facto party strategist Viorel Hrebenciuc. Local leaders were reportedly displeased with the lack of tangible–i.e. financial–benefits from the PSD’s unofficial cohabitation with the PNL-UDMR government; parliamentarians were concerned as well about dismal prospects in the coming European Parliament elections given the PSD’s continuing under-performance in the opinion polls. Euro-Parliamentarian Dan Mihalache told Polcouns that his party was even having trouble recruiting candidates to contest the upcoming European Parliament elections given the prospects of serving only a truncated (e.g., just over a year) term in office because of the late election date. Other party dissidents including former PSD Strategy Chief Vasile Dancu likened inclusion in the party’s European Parliament candidate list to involuntary “exile” for opposing the Geoana-Iliescu-Hrebenciuc axis.

3. (C) In a meeting August 16, PSD Vice President Victor Ponta described the PSD’s strategy session as a “spontaneous” explosion of discontent with the direction taken by Geoana.One by one, party leaders criticized the PSD’s strategy of “constructive opposition” as confusing to voters and a recipe for defeat in coming elections. Participants at the meeting reportedly argued that voters could not grasp how the PSD could simultaneously claim to be an opposition party as well as a supporter of the Tariceanu status quo. (Note: we heard from other contacts that there were gripes as well that the PNL had stolen the credit for recent PSD policy initiatives including a generous pension increase. PSD leaders also reportedly criticized Geoana and Hrebenciuc for their decision to renege on the PSD’s earlier multi-party agreement to support uninominal electoral reform, arguing that this handed President Basescu an opportunity to call for a referendum on the uninominal vote issue.) Ponta said that the strategy meeting–while stormy–ended after a half hour, as Geoana quickly sized up the mood of the gathering and capitulated to the demands of party leaders. Ponta concluded that the meeting had been a repudiation of the strategies chosen by Geoana and Hrebenciuc, and a victory for the “Cluj group” and other party dissidents. He noted pointedly that the PSD leadership subsequently publicly extended an olive branch to former party strategist Vasile Dancu who recently resigned his party leadership position amidst bitter criticism of Geoana and Hrebenciuc.

4. (SBU) In his subsequent press remarks, Geoana (conspicuously surrounded by Cluj group leaders) told the assembled press pool that the Tariceanu government had “lost the trust” of Romanians and of a majority of mainstream political parties. Geoana also blamed the government for failing to deliver economic benefits to the country, including its “lamentable performance” in absorbing EU funds.

He concluded that it was now time, after three years of underperformance, to replace the government with one capable of focusing on the “real priorities” of the country including pension and health care reform and the fight against poverty.

Geoana said that the PSD would contribute to any formula that would bring about a “competent and serious” government. In subsequent press remarks, Geoana and other PSD leaders made clear their expectation that Geoana will be named the next Prime Minister.

5. (C) PSD President Geoana phoned the Ambassador August 16 with his version of events. (The Ambassador is currently on leave in the U.S.) Geoana recounted that much of his new thinking had come about during a recent visit to the United States and in his conversations with Americans both in and out of the administration. He added that the NATO summit was another reason to proceed quickly with the no-confidence vote. Geoana insisted that the PSD could no longer “tolerate” supporting an ultra-minority government that had just 20 percent of the seats in parliament, and insisted that he was serious about taking down the Tariceanu government. This was not a bargaining ploy in order to obtain ministerial appointments for PSD leaders or to win other concessions. Geoana also acknowledged that the PSD strategy session had been a verbal “slug-fest” but insisted that most of the arguments were over who should take over as Prime Minister after Tariceanu. When reminded that President Basescu had clearly stated earlier this year that Geoana would not be his choice for the Prime Ministership, Geoana acknowledged the point, but replied that his party was firm in its view that he had to be the new Prime Minister.

6. (C) Comment: The surprise PSD announcement that it would abandon its informal co-habitation with the Tariceanu government and pursue a no-confidence vote puts an end to what has been a relatively calm summer season. Nevertheless, we remain skeptical — as do most in the Romanian political elite — that the no-confidence motion will ultimately lead to the removal of the Tariceanu government. Despite the PSD’s public insistence that this is not a bargaining ploy, we have heard through parliamentary contacts that the wily Hrebenciuc has been telling his PNL counterparts “not to worry” as sufficient numbers of PSD deputies would abstain from voting so that the no-confidence motion would fail. This tracks with comments that Hrebenciuc made to the Charge on August 13. Hrebenciuc insisted that any change in direction by the Social Democrats would most likely lead to more overt cooperation with the Liberals, including possibly a limited entry into true co-governance and a “redistribution” of ministerial posts. He even hinted that Geoana might take “an international position” at the end of the year, leaving his party post behind. In the event that a no-confidence vote succeeds, the next steps remain murky since there is a range of possible outcomes under the Romanian constitution. These range from a fast-track dismissal of the Prime Minister followed by a vote on a new cabinet within ten days; the slow-track could involve the President invoking new elections if Parliament fails twice to approve a new Prime Minister within 60 days. Elections must then take place within three months after dissolution, meaning that a lame-duck government could remain in office even up to five months after losing a confidence vote. At this stage, however, most observers argue that parliamentarians collectively are still loath to agree a no-confidence vote, since this could lead to their having to contest for their seats in early elections. However, as the failed PSD putsch last spring against President Basescu so clearly demonstrated, events in Romania can quickly take on their own momentum and not be amenable to a modulated approach. End Comment.

TAPLIN

 

 

 

 

DECL: 09/20/2017

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, RO

SUBJECT: ROMANIA: POLITICAL PLAYERS READY TO THROW THE DICE

Classified By: Cda a.i.Mark Taplin, reasons 1.4 (b) & (f)

1. (C) Summary. As Bucharest summer has given way to fall, so too has the political lethargy of July and August been replaced in recent weeks by sharpened conflict and stormy negotiations among the leading players. The main opposition Social Democratic Party (PSD), the largest in parliament, finally appears poised to introduce a motion of no-confidence against the government of PM Calin Popescu-Tariceanu on September 24. The PSD Executive Committee took this step following weeks of internal uncertainty that included active discussion of removing PSD president Mircea Geoana from his position. Separately, Parliament rejected two emergency ordinances from last April that had provided the legal framework for Tariceanu,s reshuffling of the government and removal of President Basescu’s Democratic Party (PD) allies. One of the few points our interlocutors agree on is that no one really knows how the dice will land in the wake of Geoana’s latest political improvisations, and the efforts of his many antagonists inside and outside the PSD to frustrate his plans. While every imaginable scenario is still in play at this writing, it is just possible that we are witnessing the last weeks of the current National Liberal Party-led government. As one Basescu advisor told us, “There are still so many unresolved questions — but also real hope” for bringing down the PM and his cohort. End Summary.

2. (C) At a September 19 gathering in Bucharest of the executive committee of the main opposition Social Democratic Party (PSD), the party’s top national and regional leaders voted to introduce a motion of no confidence against the Tariceanu government on Monday, September 24. The decision followed delays and staunch opposition from within the PSD from old-guard lions like former President Ion Iliescu and former PM Adrian Nastase. The pro-Presidential Democratic Party (PD) and the Liberal Democratic Party (PLD) have already announced they would support a censure motion. Were the PD and PLD, alongside the full contingent of the PSD and its allies, to turn out in favor of the no-confidence resolution, the votes would be there to turn PM Tariceanu and his Liberal government out of office.

3. (C) Yet, as is usually the case hereabouts, things are not so simple. Some PSD leaders, while exasperated with the current “concubinage” informally backing Tariceanu, while on paper remaining in opposition, are still hoping their vote to table a censure motion would persuade the PNL to bring the PSD into the government. The PM, along with his fellow Liberals, has made it clear they would not relish being the junior partner in any such arrangement, and has repeatedly rejected the PSD,s overtures — at least in public. Meanwhile, PSD president Mircea Geoana on September 18 &secretly8 met with President Traian Basescu, although both acknowledged publicly that following day that they had done so. One PSD Executive Secretary told PolOffs that the discussion included consideration of the prospect for a PD-PSD-UDMR &national unity8 government. Under this scenario, the PSD would seek control over the Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance, Labor, Agriculture and Environment portfolios. Alternatively, others in the PSD argued that they would be satisfied remaining in the opposition assuming that Basescu asked the PD to form a minority government. In contrast, PD President Emil Boc publicly rejected the notion of a deal with PSD, insisting on the party forming a government only after national elections.

4. (C) Prospects for Geoana to seize the reins of the government at this time are poor; in fact, he is clinging hard to the back of the tiger in trying to outmaneuver his rivals within his own party. PSD Deputy Victor Ponta described for Poloffs on September 17 a PSD party that was paralyzed by factional infighting. One group, led by the older generation (Hrebenciuc, Nastase, and Iliescu) would love to remove Geoana from the party leadership. The Geoana group is intent on getting into power regardless of the collateral damage. A third faction, by Ponta’s account, represents those interested in reform, stability and rebuilding the PSD away from personalities; it is frustrated by the business as usual attitude among the warring party chieftains. Ponta lamented the fact that there was no single personality within the PSD who could replace Geoana through consensus.

5. (C) If the apparent chaos within the Social Democratic ranks were not already enough, the schism between PSD and PNL widened significantly on September 18, when PSD and other parliamentarians rejected two emergency ordinances issued in April 2007 that provided the legal framework for the reorganization of the Tariceanu government last April, following the removal of the pro-Basescu PD ministers. At least in theory, the Tariceanu government would thereby be compelled to return to the structure it had at the moment of accession to the European Union. The Parliament’s rejection of the two ordinances is without precedent and took the government by surprise. Until the rejection of the emergency ordinances is formally published in the Official Gazette, no decision on the way ahead will be taken. The Liberals announced September 19 that they would consider seeking the arbitration of the Constitutional Court on this issue. Of course, the point could be moot if the Tariceanu government is brought down in the coming days, although any new government should be formed on the structure pre-dating the April rearrangement.

6. (C) At week’s end, what little was clear was that there would be enough signatures to submit the motion in Parliament, most likely on September 24. PSD spokesperson and Senator Cristian Diaconescu told us on September 21 that his party and Basescu’s Democrats would definitely not officially co-habitate. He pointed towards potential realignments between the Liberals and Democrats — revisiting the original 2004 electoral alliance — or (more likely, we believe) among Social Democrats and Liberals. Nor was a “unity” government of technocrats ruled out. Later in the same conversation, Diaconescu said he foresaw “one party government.” “Only I’m not sure which one,” he exclaimed. Another active ingredient in this stew was President Basescu, whom Diaconescu reported would call together party leaders, in his role as constitutional guarantor, for “official” political consultations during what will be a very lively period of negotiations between the time a motion of no-confidence is filed and when a vote is actually taken — a period that Diaconescu estimated would be up to eight days. Diaconescu spoke positively of Basescu’s approach in his now widely publicized meeting with Geoana. Basescu, he stated, did not want another minority government. Rather, the President was looking to form as stable a governmental configuration to replace “Tariceanu-2″ as possible, even if it were “time-limited” until scheduled elections in June, 2008.

7. (C) National Security Advisor and former PD parliamentarian Mihai Stanisoara was nearly as contradictory on September 21 in sizing up in advance the following week’s political drama. “What is sure,” he commented, “is that the motion will be placed” on the parliamentary calendar. The question after would be, “who will win the fight between Geoana and (PSD old guard political strategist Viorel) Hrebenciuc?” There was “a real chance for change,” he stressed, even as he acknowledged that many “unsolved” questions remained. “But there is also a big hope,” he quickly added. On the other hand, Bucharest Mayor and PD bigwig Adrian Videanu sounded more assured in a September 21 phone conversation with Charge. His view was that the vote of no-confidence would pass, and that his party would take the reins of power. “The PSD can’t continue this way,” he insisted, “drifting not in opposition, not in power.” There were common interests, Videanu explained, between his Democrats (including Stolojan’s Liberal Democrats) and the PSD. But a formal arrangement of power-sharing could only take place after elections, probably in June next year. Meanwhile, the PD had concluded that, “for the sake of the President,” it would need to lead a government in the interim, even at the loss of some percentage of its current commanding forty percent support in the polls, because Basescu’s political credibility would be compromised were he to choose a Social Democrat for a PM. In the end, Videanu concluded, the President’s popularity would be the decisive political factor for PD electoral success in the years ahead, so it had to be protected “at all costs.”

8. (C) Comment. While Geoana may well be able to make good the threat to bring down the PNL government, everything that would follow would still be up for grabs. The PSD’s wily Hrebenciuc, for instance, should not be underestimated; he and Liberal Party conspirators like Chamber of Deputies President Bogdan Olteanu have been busy in the corridors of power trying to forge a more formal Liberal-Social Democratic alliance — a goal that for most of the summer looked to be the most likely combination to emerge from behind the curtain. Meanwhile, Basescu is where he wants to be politically, with Tariceanu,s government more vulnerable than ever, and the deeply split PSD out on a political limb. One Romanian proverb may be especially suited to the political drama ahead: “The wheel of fortune never stops.” End comment

TAPLIN

 

 

 

 

DECL: 11/19/2017

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RO

SUBJECT: NOVEMBER 25 EUROELECTIONS: HIGH APATHY, LOW TURNOUT, BIG STAKES

Classified By: Political Counselor Ted Tanoue for Reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d).

1. (SBU) Summary: Romanians go to the polls Sunday to vote for representatives to the European Parliament and to decide a referendum on electoral system reforms proposed by President Basescu. Most observers anticipate low voter turnout, despite initial hopes in the President’s camp that the injection of the referendum issue would help raise voter interest. The election results nevertheless will have a major political impact, not least because this is the first real test of voter support since 2004, and will likely set the tone for a series of four upcoming consecutive elections–local, parliamentary, EP, and presidential contests–taking place over the next 24 months. Party insiders in the PSD and PNL have confirmed that negotiations are underway over the formation of a “Tariceanu III” cabinet, with the PSD joining the PNL in a coalition government. Both sides are awaiting the final vote results as they haggle over ministerial seats. Other possible second-order effects of Sunday’s contest are leadership changes in the PSD and PNL party hierarchies and the fates of the pro-Basescu PLD, the ethnic Hungarian UDMR, and Gigi Becali’s right-nationalist PNG. End Summary.

Public Unenthusiastic About Two-for-One Vote ——————————————–

2. (SBU) Romania will hold its first elections for the European Parliament on November 25. While initially scheduled for May 13, the EP contest was repeatedly postponed for a number of reasons, including the tense domestic political climate after the suspension of President Basesculast April and the subsequent desire of many political parties to defer any electoral showdown given the overwhelming popularity of President Basescu. For the first time, Romanians will directly elect their 35 representatives to the European Parliament. This direct vote replaces a provisional system employed since Romania’s January 1, 2007 accession into the European Union, where Romania was represented in the European Parliament by 35 parliamentarians chosen from party lists in accordance with their respective parties’ shares of domestic parliamentary seats. The term in office of the newly elected Members of the European Parliament (MEP) will be a short one, lasting only until the next EP elections scheduled for the Spring of 2009.

3. (SBU) President Basescu has injected an additional layer of complexity by calling a referendum on reforming the current electoral system, to take place on the same day as the EP election. Basescu’s critics have accused the President of doing so in order to inject himself into the political hustings and to lend his coat-tails to candidates from the Democratic Party (PD) and the Liberal Democrats (PLD). Voters have the opportunity to answer “yes” or “no” to the question: “Do you agree that, starting with the first legislative elections, all the deputies and senators be elected in uni-nominal constituencies, on the basis of a majoritarian two-round system?” Although scheduled on the same day as the EP race, the Tariceanu government has ensured that the referendum will be a completely separate process, entailing voting in different precincts administered by separate electoral bureaus and counted by different teams of electoral officials. Analysts expect the complicated double-voting process on election day to lead to confusion and a low turnout.

4. (SBU) Thus far, the electoral race has been marked by an uninspired campaign by a slate of mostly unknown EP candidates. Public apathy is reflected in IRI polls indicating that only 5 percent of respondents were “very interested” and 32 percent somewhat “interested” in the Euro-elections. With five back-to-back elections taking place over the next two years (including local elections in June 2008, legislative elections scheduled for November 2008, EP races in Spring 2009, and a Presidential contest in November 2009), most major political parties are saving their powder for future races and have eschewed expensive electronic media campaigns. Instead they have relied on small rallies, leaflets, door-to-door campaign, and other low-cost (and low impact) campaign techniques. The PNL campaign, for example, featured yellow-jacketed cyclists weaving through Bucharest’s treacherous traffic in bicycles adorned with

campaign posters. Vote fraud has not been a major concern, perhaps reflecting the overall public apathy regarding the race. The electoral watchdog Pro Democracy Association has told Embassy that it will mobilize 1,000 election observers, mainly in rural areas.

Electoral Bellwether

——————–

5. (C) Recent media polls and data shared with us by various contacts show surprising consistency. The PD appears poised to take some 35-40 percent of the votes; the PSD is running at around 18-22 percent; and the PNL currently shows a support rate of some 12-15 percent. This likely translates to some 10-15 seats for PD, 7-8 seats for the PSD, and 5-6 seats for the PNL. Four other parties have prospects for crossing the 5 percent electoral threshold, including the Greater Romania Party (PRM), the Democratic Union of Hungarians from Romania (UDMR), and two parties not currently represented in parliament–Gigi Becali’s New Generation Party (PNG) and the Liberal-Democratic Party (PLD).

6. (C) Voter mobilization may become the critical factor. The UDMR campaign is running scared, given the independent campaign of Reformed Bishop Laszlo Tokes, who may split the ethnic Hungarian vote. UDMR deputy Mate Andras confided that his party’s own polling indicated that they currently have between 4.2-4.5 percent, with Tokes drawing around 1 percent.

Similarly, this is a make-or-break test for the nascent PLD.

With polls suggesting that they are pulling in between 4 and 5 percent of the votes, the PLD is pulling out all the stops in mobilizing supporters through events featuring PLD heavyweights including former Prime Minister Stolojan, legislators Christian Boureanu, Raluca Turcan, former Agriculture Minister Gheorghe Flutur, and former PNL President Valeriu Stoica. The two pro-presidential parties-)PD and PLD–have also stressed the Basescu connection, including campaign rallies with the President. The PD message has touted the election as a coming-out event for a “new political class”, in line with Basescu,s message that an affirmative uni-nominal referendum vote will change the way that Romania’s future leaders are selected. PSD contacts have warned that intra-party infighting has led to many local party branches opting out from actively engaging in the campaign.

Negotiations Intensify for a possible PNL-PSD Cabinet

——————————————— ——–

7. (C) This will be the first real electoral test since the legislative elections of November 2004, and after three turbulent years of domestic political infighting all parties will soon know exactly where they stand with the voters. Whatever the party, a positive outcome in the EP elections will be a good omen for the upcoming local and national elections. More directly, the election will influence the formation of a possible “Tariceanu III” cabinet in the aftermath of the elections. PNL Vice President Dan Motreanu confirmed to Polcouns that negotiations are underway, adding that the real bargaining would not take place until after the election results are in. A poor showing for the PSD–which he defined as anything less 25 percent–would likely result in Mircea Geoana’s ouster as PSD President. He added that the election was a test for the PNL too, as any result below a ten-percent threshold would increase pressures on Prime Minister Tariceanu to resign, or for his party to split. Motreanu demurred when asked whether Tariceanu supported going into coalition with the PSD, remarking that many PNL supporters were reluctant to ally with a party that was the PNL’s ideological opposite. Motreanu also noted the divided state of the PSD, and asked rhetorically, “which PSD do we ally with?” He concluded that current polls suggested that the likely outcome would simply be continuation of a status quo that many political players were quite comfortable with.

8. (C) PSD legislator Victor Ponta said that PSD President Geoana was now exhorting the party leadership to “get ready” to join in governance with the PNL on the 26th of November. PNL elders including former President Iliescu, former PM Nastase, and legislative heavyweight Viorel Hrebenciuc were all supporting the coalition option. Ponta remarked, however, on the different factional and personality cross-currents now coming into play. Within the PNL, for example, many of the Ministers likely to be replaced–Interior, MFA, Education, and Justice, were individuals close to Chamber of Deputies President Bogdan Olteanu. Tariceanu was reluctant to let these ministers go out of concerns that this might precipitate a break with Olteanu (and with Olteanu’s oligarch backers, including Iasi businessman Relu Fenechiu). Similarly, said Ponta, it was a sign of Geoana’s weakened stature in the PSD that Tariceanu wanted to negotiate directly with Iliescu and Nastase, rather than to deal with Geoana. Interpersonal rivalries were also at work in the PSD. Geoana’s main backer now was “Cluj Group” head Ioan Rus, but Rus opposed a closer alliance with the Liberals. He added, however, that given their mutual

electoral weaknesses vis-a-vis Basescu, one issue which might BUCHAREST 00001296 003 OF 003

help “cement” a PSD-PNL partnership was their shared interest in passing legislation postponing the 2008 local and parliamentary races until the following year.

9. (C) Asked about negotiations over cabinet positions, Ponta echoed Motreanu in remarking that any real horse-trading would take place only after the election results came in. Current discussions touched on dividing two current Ministries–Interior/Administrative Reform and Finance/Economics into four separate ministries to create more bargaining chips. Ministries on the PSD’s “wish list” included the Agriculture and Labor Ministries. Geoana had also indicated that he wanted the position of Deputy Prime Minister, but was wavering on whether he might concurrently assume the Foreign Ministry portfolio. Geoana’s dilemma was that if he took the MFA portfolio, pressures would increase for him to step down as PSD party head; if he didn’t do so, then Cristian Diaconescu (who is increasingly seen as a possible Geoana’s successor) would seek the FM slot. Finally, Ponta remarked that, as the PSD’s expert on judicial issues, he should rightly be a candidate for the Justice Minister portfolio. He noted, however, that when party seniors met to discuss possible ministerial appointments, Vrancea County PSD baron Marian Opresan reportedly remarked, “Victor? No way, he’ll send us all to jail…”

10. (C) Comment: Despite widespread public apathy, this may well turn out to be an important election. Historically, the PSD has always held pride of place as Romania’s leading political party. However, Basescu’s PD appears poised to surpass–and perhaps double–the PSD’s vote share. Moreover, despite the uncertain fate of uninominal electoral reform, this election will likely confirm the pre-eminence of the three mainstream political parties (PD, PNL, and PSD) and the precarious situation now being faced by the smaller parties including the PLD, UDMR, and perhaps even Vadim Tudor’s right-extremist PRM, which is facing new competition from Gigi Becali’s New Generation Party (PNG). End Comment. TAUBMAN

 

 

 

DECL: 11/20/2018

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, RO

SUBJECT: PNL, PSD LEGISLATORS: BASESCU’S GOT THE MOJO IN NAMING PM, FORMING NEW GOVERNMENT

Classified By: DCM JGuthrie-Corn, 1.5 (b) and (d)

1. (C) Summary: In separate conversations, two prominent legislators–one PSD, the other PNL–noted signs of an incipient PSD stampede to form a post-election coalition with Basescu’s PD-L. They agree that the PSD cannot stay out of office for another four years and has to join the next government at all costs. Both suggested that President Basescu might offer an ostensibly “technocratic” Prime Ministerial candidate and insist on formation of a “national unity” government to deal with an impending economic crisis. They were doubtful that parliamentarians–exhausted after a month-long election campaign–would be enthusiastic about holding a divisive vote to suspend the President, and wouldbe loathe to reject Basescu’s second-round choice for PM (which would trigger new elections), given their reluctance to return to the hustings for yet another campaign. End Summary.

2. (C) PSD Legislator Victor Ponta told Polcouns on November 17 that voter apathy and the absence of an overarching campaign theme meant that the default parliamentary election strategy this year was a time-consuming and expensive door-to-door campaign. He said the 2008 race was five times more expensive than in 2004. Ponta credited President Basescu as “more clever” in tapping into popular anxieties about the economy, with well-timed recent visits to local automobile factories including the Dacia and Ford plants. Asked about other leaders, Ponta replied acidly, “I haven’t seen Geoana for a while,” adding that Prime Minister Tariceanu appeared to be too busy “drafting plans for Romania in 2020.” He said that Tariceanu’s campaign missteps–including his opposition to raising teacher salaries–conveyed a sense of lame-duck “deja vu” reminiscent of PM Nastase’s waning days in office in 2004.

3. (C) On the possible formation of a PSD-PNL government, Ponta remarked that “There’s no way to make it happen now except to suspend the President. That would be suicidal as it makes Basescu the unbeatable candidate next year.” While some PSD leaders, including Chamber of Deputies PSD whip Viorel Hrebenciuc, were still insisting on a coalition with the PNL, the growing mood in PSD ranks was that the party could not afford to remain out of office for another election cycle. Moreover, local party leaders were also aware of the benefits of incumbency and were pressuring the party center to join the next government at all costs. Ponta said that informal inter-party discussions were already taking place (Note: this was confirmed in some press reports today), and remarked that a PSD-PD-L coalition would be an “unbeatable” combination, with 70 percent of parliamentary seats between them. Ponta joked that only two PSD leaders were against the option–”(Former President) Iliescu because he’s too old, and me because I’m too young.” Ponta added that another reason why a PSD-PNL government was less likely now was because many of Tariceanu’s PNL rivals would do better in opposition, remarking that if Tariceanu continued to head the party, PNL heavyweights Crin Antonescu, Ludovic Orban, and Norica Nicolai would be “dead” politically. They are less hungry than we are, he concluded. (Note: Orban in a telcon today confirmed this, saying that a “temporary” time in opposition would have a purifying effect on the PNL.)

4. (C) Noting the President’s penchant for the surprise move, Ponta speculated that Basescu might propose a lesser-known figure as PM to keep his opponents off-balance. Asked whether current intelligence service head George Maior fit this description, Ponta responded that Maior was a good choice–clean and confirmable, with a good relationship with the Basescu and Tariceanu camps and with the PSD as well. Basescu’s ability to play the Maior card helped pressure other PSD leaders including Mircea Geoana to be more compliant. Ponta said that Geoana’s main objective now was to ensure that no other PSD leader was promoted above him. Ponta predicted that “Geoana will settle, he’s not Basescu.” He speculated that Geoana’s bottom line would be Deputy Prime Minister (and concurrent Foreign Minister) as long as the next government was headed by a nominally “technocratic” Prime Minister.

5. (C) Ponta said that if the election results conformed to the polling data, the PSD and PD-L could split the ministerial posts equally, with the bargaining being over which party controlled which ministry. He acknowledged that he was the party’s front runner to be the next Justice Minister in any coalition involving the PSD. He said he was aware that current Justice Minister Predoiu wanted quick passage of the new Criminal Code draft now being circulated, but predicted that this was a decision for the next government. He added that Romania needed “radical reform” of its judiciary and legal system, and this was only possible if the next coalition enjoyed a strong parliamentary majority. Asked about the prospects for quick formation of the next government, Ponta replied that–after an exhausting campaign–the last thing that politicians wanted was the prospect of a long, drawn-out battle over the next government. Nobody wanted a hung parliament and a return to another round of elections, and nobody wanted Tariceanu to linger on indefinitely as head of a caretaker government. “Everything will be finished before Christmas, and Basescu gets the final word,” he concluded.

6. (C) In a separate meeting with Polcouns November 18, PNL legislator (and PNL Central Bureau member) George Scutaru said that it had been a tough, exhausting, and expensive door-to-door campaign. He was walking 6 to 10 kilometers every day in his Buzau constituency. It was a challenge because it was a traditionally “red” (e.g., PSD) district, and the PSD had reneged on its pre-campaign agreement with his party not to compete in his district. Scutaru said that Justice Minister Predoiu was a PNL candidate in a neighboring precinct, and that his rival–a PSD businessman–had already spent over a million leu in order to win the contest, adding that the businessman was currently under indictment and his

main motive was to win a seat in order to acquire parliamentary immunity.

7. (C) Scutaru acknowledged that various parties were now beginning to talk about future coalitions, but insisted that the serious bargaining would take place only after the election results came in. He said that Basescu was the wild card and that “everything is now possible.” The scenario currently making the rounds was that Basescu intended to nominate Teodor Stolojan as Prime Minister for the first round–with the full expectation that the nomination would fail to win parliamentary approval. Basescu would then put forward a “technocratic” choice–perhaps SRI head George Maior or SIE Director Razvan Ungureanu as his second round nominee, and would argue that the impending economic crisis necessitated the formation of a national unity government.

8. (C) Scutaru opined that this gambit had a good chance of succeeding. Convincing individual party leaders one by one into joining an ad hoc coalition was more likely now as the uninominal electoral rules may well have a corrosive effect on party discipline. Moreover, party discipline would be at an especially low point immediately after the elections, given the turnover in senior positions and the view of many incoming (and senior) parliamentarians that “I got here on my own.” Scuataru added that the threat of new parliamentary elections also made it unlikely that Basescu’s second choice for PM would be rejected, and said that PSD leader Adrian Nastase’s recent threat to order PSD legislators to boycott parliament in order to prevent formation of a new government was “not serious.”

9. (C) In response to Polcoun’s query as to whether a PSD-PNL move to suspend President Basescu was now less likely, Scutaru responded that Basescu was now in the “center of the game” thanks to the constitution and “everything depended on him.” He noted that Basescu’s PD-L had adopted a more accommodating tone with his party, and was no longer insisting on Tariceanu’s departure as a precondition for a PD-L-PNL coalition. He acknowledged that the PSD was “hungry for power” and needed to get back into the game at almost any cost. Scutaru mused that the PNL could go into opposition to establish its bona fides as the only credible center-right party, but added quickly that the preference for any party was to be in government. Asked whether SRI Director Ungureanu’s nomination for PM would be acceptable to the PNL, he replied, “it depends on what else is on the table.”

10. (C) Comment: It was clear from our conversation with our interlocutors that a PSD-PNL coalition is no longer as likely

an option as it was a few weeks ago, and that enthusiasm is waning in both parties for the drastic option of suspending the President in order to ensure that an acting President would nominate a Prime Ministerial candidate from their ranks. Moreover, the PD-L’s long-held confidence that the Romanian constitution puts the President squarely in the driver’s seat in terms of naming the next Prime Minister appears to have been well placed. Nevertheless, despite recent favorable polling data, a PD-L romp in the upcoming parliamentary election is no sure thing, given that its largely urban middle-class electoral base may well decide to stay at home (or to leave town) in droves on an election date–in the middle of a three-day holiday weekend–that was specifically chosen in order to depress voter turnout. End Comment.

TAUBMAN